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The no-arbitrage hypothesis and inertia in forward markets1
José Luis Ferreira*
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Praveen Kujal+
Middlesex University
Stephen Rassenti++
Chapman University

Abstract:
Allaz (1992) showed that the no-arbitrage condition in forward markets is obtained as a
feature of the equilibrium if the model allows for strategic behavior on the part of the
buyers. He showed that having active buyers is equivalent to passive buyers plus the noarbitrage hypothesis. We test this experimentally in a forward market by allowing for
active buyer’s under exogenously or endogenously determined market closure. We
further test an inertia hypothesis that looks at whether past participation in a spot-market
results in quantities being limited in the forward market stage. Importantly, the noarbitrage condition can only be tested with both real buyers and sellers participating in a
forward market. We find that the no-arbitrage hypothesis does not hold. Prices in the
forward market are higher than in the spot. The inertia hypothesis is not supported
either. Even though almost competitive levels of output are observed, sellers obtain a
third of the total surplus. We confirm earlier experimental results on competition
enhancing effects of forward markets.
JEL codes: L13, C92, G13.
Keywords: Oligopoly, forward markets, no-arbitrage hypothesis, futures pricing.
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1. Introduction2
In his well-known paper Allaz (1992) showed that the no-arbitrage condition in
forward markets is obtained as a feature of the equilibrium if the model allows for
strategic behavior on the part of the buyers. He showed that having active buyers is
equivalent to passive buyers plus the no-arbitrage hypothesis. While passive buyers are
standard in most experimental research, the equivalence hypothesis of Allaz (1992) has
not been tested. In this paper we experimentally test the no-arbitrage hypothesis in
forward markets with active buyers. This enables trades at different prices, in different
openings of the forward markets, and in the spot market (in the forward market phase).
We also test for an additional inertia hypothesis to see whether experience in spot
(quantity) markets carries over to the forward market phase.
Allaz and Vila (1993) showed that, besides risk-hedging, there exists a strategic
motive for the use of forward markets, even in the case of certainty and perfect foresight
(of demand), in a Cournot oligopoly. In their model, producers participate in forward
transactions (as strategic variables) to improve their situation in the spot market. The
result is one of both higher quantity and market efficiency, and of lower profits
compared to the Cournot equilibrium. They also showed that, as the number of forward
markets openings increase, oligopolists will produce near the competitive level.
One of the key features of the Allaz and Vila (1993) model is the assumption of
an automated demand. Consider a typical Cournot market. Typically, the demand side is
modeled with an aggregated demand function for competitive buyers. There is no
strategic behavior on the part of the buyers and, for every quantity offered by the sellers,
the corresponding price is the one at which the demand absorbs the quantity. Now
consider the model with one forward market previous to the spot (market). In this case,
when firms choose quantities in the forward market, they know that there will be a spot
market later on where they will compete for the residual demand. This has two
consequences: (i) buyers need to anticipate this in their plans for the first opening -this

The experiments had IRB approval Under the title "The Economics of Decision Making" (IRB permit #:
1415H012, Chapman University), the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Chapman University provided
ethical approval and approval of an electronic consent procedure for all experiments done at Economic
Science Institute (ESI) that involve no deception, no audio or video taping, and no invasive procedures, or
food or drugs. To be included in the ESI subject database, volunteers must provide electronic consent
(name, student ID#, and acknowledgment of agreement to the terms of an electronic consent form they
must read). Subjects for all generic decision-making experiments covered by IRB permit #: 1415H012 are
then randomly selected from the database to participate in particular experiments.
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is the novelty of their results-, and (ii) the price must be the same in all openings of the
market to avoid arbitrage.
Allaz (1992) showed that the no-arbitrage condition in (ii) is obtained as a
feature of the equilibrium if the model allows for strategic behavior on the part of the
buyers. Thus, both models give identical results. However, as the model with automated
buyers is simpler, it is widely used in theoretical and experimental research (Le Coq and
Orzen (2006), Brandts J, Pezanis-Christou P, Schram A (2008), Koten and Ortmann
(2013), Ferreira, Kujal and Rassenti (2016), Cox, Karam and Pelster (forthcoming)).
In our experimental design, firms and buyers choose not only quantities, but also
prices, and the market clears accordingly in every forward market3. The rule by which
the market clears is based on the actions taken only in that forward market and does not
depend on the equilibrium of the remaining game. Thus, the no-arbitrage condition only
holds if both buyers and sellers behave as the theory predicts. Depending on the
experimental treatment, the closure of the forward market is either exogenously or
endogenously determined. While the exogenous close, with a predetermined number of
futures markets previous to the spot market, is used in most experimental setups, the
endogenous close is an adaptation which mimics the indefinitely repeated forward
market version of Allaz and Vila (1993). 4
The second distinguishing aspect of our design tests whether prior experience in
a spot market has an inertia effect on the forward market stage. While this should, in
theory, have no effect on the forward market, it is important to test whether the
existence of inertia can indeed alter future actions. Given this, we add the forward
markets after the sellers have participated in a series of (only) spot market duopolies. In
sum, our design enables us to check for two new hypotheses, the “no-arbitrage” and the
“inertia” hypotheses. This is in addition to checking for the, by now well established,
pro-competitive effect of the forward markets in experimental forward markets.
Our experiments provide some new results on prices in the forward and spot
phase, and surplus sharing. The introduction of real buyers in the forward markets
enables us to track prices during the sequence of market openings. We find that prices
are higher in the earlier forward markets. This has two important consequences: (i) we
find that the no-arbitrage condition is not satisfied, and (ii) in the case of the
endogenous close, the sellers keep a third of the total surplus. This occurs even when
3
4

We discuss this further in the experimental design section.
That was implemented in Ferreira, Kujal and Rassenti (2016).
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the total quantity sold is very close to the competitive outcome where theoretically they
should make zero profits. Interestingly, the above occurs even if subjects seem to be
aware (reflected in their forecasts) of the way prices change as the futures markets
unfold. Finally, we confirm that forward markets are competition enhancing.
Additionally, the size of the pro-competitive effect is consistent with previous literature
for both the fixed, and indefinite, numbers of forward markets.
Literature review:
There is already some experimental literature that has studied the strategic
market for forward markets in experiments with automated buyers (LeCoq and Orzen,
2006; Ferreira, Kujal, Rassenti, 2016; Brandts, Pezanis-Christou and Schram, 2008) and
in the field (Wolak, 2000). Due to automated buyers the literature only tests for the
strategic motive finding that forward markets are indeed competition enhancing with the
effect increasing as the number of forward markets increases to two (Ferreira, Kujal,
Rassenti, 2016) relative to one (LeCoq and Orzen, 2006). To further test the effect of
increasing the number of (periods of) forward markets, Ferreira, Kujal and Rassenti
(2016) implement the endogenous close version of a forward market and find it to be
competition enhancing with little role for the final spot market. Thus, confirming Allaz
and Vila’s (1993) assertions regarding efficiency enhancement and competitive limits of
output with a large number of forward markets. 5
There are other experimental papers that study questions different from ours
using forward markets. Cox, Karam and Pelster (forthcoming) experimentally study a
dynamic multi-period Cournot duopoly with a simultaneous option to manage financial
risk and a real option to delay supply. They find that firms make use of the hedging
instrument thus enhancing competition. Meanwhile, Koten (2021) experimentally
studies the risk premia in electricity markets.
Nevertheless, research with real world data on forward markets is scarce. For the
Australian power market, Wolak (2000) shows that the effect of using forward markets
is pro-competitive. One should, however, add a note of caution. Even though the use of
forward markets is spreading, in many instances market regulation requires firms to
participate in these markets. Most of the theoretical models described above agree that,
when used, forward markets are pro-competitive. However, they differ in a very
For the Australian power market, Wolak (2000) shows that the effect is pro-competitive when firms use
forward markets.
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important respect. In some models, the equilibrium behaviour forces firms to enter the
forward market, while in others, equilibria exist in which firms avoid these markets.
Hence, sensu stricto, Wolak’s conclusion is only about the subgames in which firms do
enter into forward market competition and says nothing about the question of whether
firms would avoid competition by not using forward markets when allowed to decide in
a non-regulated market. Wolak (2003) also identifies the lack of forward contracting in
the California electricity market as the primary cause of extremely high spot prices for
the period June 2000 to June 2001. Moraga-Gonzalez, van Eijkel and Kuper (2016)
study the strategic vs. the risk motive in markets for natural gas. Using data from the
Dutch wholesale market for natural gas they present evidence that strategic reasons play
an important role at explaining the observed firms’ hedging activity.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present details of the
experimental design; Section 3 first presents the results for quantity competition.
Section 3.1. and 3.2 theoretical, hypotheses, and experimental results for exogenous and
endogenous close, respectively. Section 4 concludes.
2. The experiment design6,7
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate student population at
Chapman University. Besides the baseline quantity setting experiments, the experiments
consisted of two treatments with exogenous (EXO) and endogenous (ENDO) number of
forward markets, with each treatment having two parts. 8 The first part is the same in
both the EXO and ENDO treatments and consists of Cournot quantity competition
which lasts for 25 periods. The second part introduces a series of forward markets
before each spot market, where the final forward market is determined exogenously
(preset) or endogenously (based on a no volume rule). Each spot market duopoly with
forward markets is played for a total of 50 periods for both the EXO and ENDO
treatments (see Table 1 for experimental design).
All participants knew exactly the format and the number of periods they would
be playing. The subjects were randomly allocated to being buyers or sellers. Each
duopoly consisted of two buyers and two sellers. Sellers had a cost 𝑐𝑐 = 12 for selling
We ran some preliminary tests and a pilot experiment that served to polish the instructions and to
ensure that the definitive experiments did not present any problem with regard to time constraints or
understanding of the game.
7 All instructions are presented in the Appendix.
8 We discuss details below.
6

5

𝑝𝑝

each unit, and buyers had individual demands given by 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 51 − , which gave a total
2

demand of 𝑞𝑞 = 102 − 𝑝𝑝. All duopoly pairs were fixed. Participants were told that the

experiment consisted of two parts. All participants could see a Status-Box that showed
Table 1: Experimental design
Market structure

Demand

Marginal

#Periods

#Spot #Forward

costs

markets

Spot only

25

1

-

Spot + Forward

25+50

1

2

market-Exogenous

q=102-p

c=12

close
Spot + Forward

25+indefinite 1

marketEndogenous close
Exogenous close: 2 forward markets+1 spot
Endogenous close: forward markets #indefinite + 1 spot

6

indefinite

Time Remaining in each Day, Week number, and their earnings in dollars. 9 With each
week having either two forward, and one spot market (exogenous close) or multiple
forward and one spot (endogenous close). As is customary in Cournot oligopolies,
buyers were passive with an important exception. Given that buyers would be
participating in the phase with forward markets, during the spot only phase we asked
them to make estimates of the next market price. They knew that it would have no
impact on their earnings during the first phase.
It is important that buyers were active in the subsequent forward market phase ,
stating the volume and price they were willing to pay and creating the current forward
demand. The sellers offered quantities and the program computed earnings according to
the buyers’ demand. During the second phase’s 50 periods of forward-plus-spot market,
subjects played in either the exogenous or the endogenous close treatment. We first
explain how buyers make their choices and then we explain the exogenous, and
endogenous, close forward markets. 10
We implemented the instructions such that buyers and sellers could visualize the
implication of their choices. This was important as they were going to participate as
buyers in the subsequent forward market phase. For example, buyers were told the
following:

9

See Appendix for details.
See instructions for buyers and sellers in the Appendix.

10
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Price
Your
demand

100

Market Price

20

40

Buyer choices-forward market

50

Quantity

Once we have active buyers, we need to clear markets. We do this by using a
simple method 11. The price selected by the sellers is just the price at which they expect
to sell the posted quantity. They can sell more, or less, depending on whether the price
is higher or lower. The way we implement it, the buyers are competitive, and the
equilibrium would be the same as in the model where sellers select only quantity, and
the buyers are active, and act rationally obeying the equilibrium.
Buyers know the number of buyers and sellers in each market, and that there
will be 50 periods (spot+forward). They are also told that they will need to make
decisions on how to distribute their total purchases among the different markets within
each week. The intra-week markets are called days. They are also informed that their
total purchases are ultimately determined by what they purchase actively in the forward
markets plus what is automatically (passively) purchased in the last day of the spot
market depending on the price in the last day. Specifically, they are told that:
“If you decide to buy some units in the earlier days of each week, then these
units will be subtracted from the total possible purchases in the last day. Notice that the
purchase price may be different each day.”
A buyer has to select a price and quantity pair (𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞) to bid in each of the

forward markets. This (𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞) bid, along with the buyer’s current total remaining

(unpurchased) demand at price zero, implicitly determine the buyer’s submitted linear
demand. Given this demand function, the computer automatically purchases the

An alternative would have required sellers and buyers to negotiate like in a complicated double auction
experiment. This would not be easy to implement and is complicated, because, unlike in the standard
double auction experiments, each individual can trade any quantity, and not just one unit.
11

8

quantity that maximizes profits for the buyer. For example, if the market price is the
same as the bid price, p, the buyer purchases the same quantity, q, that it bid. If the
market price is lower (higher) than the bid price, p, then the buyer purchases more (less)
than q.
For the buyers, the computer updates its remaining (unpurchased) demand given
its successive purchases. For example, suppose that a buyer purchased 15 units at a
price of 47 in the first day. The computer screen then displays a graph like the one
below for the next day. In the graph, a dotted black line shows the past results, and
remaining demand is shown in colour. 12 There are two remaining demand lines: the
lighter (upper) one shows the actual values to the buyer for its remaining units while the
heavier (lower) line shows the demand to be submitted in the next forward market if the
buyer bids the same price, 𝑝𝑝 = 47, for a quantity of all remaining unpurchased units,
𝑞𝑞 = (50 − 15) = 35.
Price

Your remaining demand

100

Your new purchase
will be along this line.
You can move it by
selecting a new price
and a new quantity.

47

50

15

Quantity

Buyers are provided with the following week-long example:

12

In the instructions the graph used employs the style of the buyer screen in the actual experiment

9

By presenting clear graphical instructions our goal was to make the
understanding of the forward market process as intuitive as possible. In addition to
information about the past days, a buyer could also make estimates about total profit
during the week by trying different combinations of prices and quantities. If a buyer did
not submit any bid in a given forward market, then the buyer cannot buy anything
unless the price is zero (at which price all remaining demand is purchased). Following
the instructions, buyers are guided through two practice rounds each with a three-day
week. They are then informed that they can themselves engage in more practice rounds.
They simply click on “ready to go on” when they think that they have had enough
practice.
Exogenous close (EXO)
We ran a total of 16 duopolies in this treatment, each consisting of two sellers
and two buyers. Each period (week) has two days with forward markets followed by
one day with a spot market. A seller offer consists of a quantity and price pair. In the
first forward market, sellers choose a quantity to sell and a reservation price, which,
together with the origin, define a supply curve. Buyers, meanwhile, choose a quantity
and a price that, together with the intercept point of the original demand (𝑝𝑝 = 0, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 =

51), define a new linear demand. Given buyers and sellers bids and offers, an
10

equilibrium price is computed, quantities are traded at the equilibrium price, and
subjects collect profits. The traded quantities are subtracted from the buyer demands
and the market proceeds to the second forward day, which is conducted similarly using
the buyers’ residual demands. After once more subtracting the traded quantities, the
spot market is finally conducted. Buyers are passive in the final spot market and sellers
play a standard Cournot game in the remaining demand.
Sellers are requested to estimate future price and quantities (both their own and
their rival’s). They are provided by a two-day market example so they can visualize
how the units demanded by the buyers interact with sellers’ offers.
Finally, sellers are also provided with an example that explains the selling process.

11

treatment 13. As in the EXO treatment, sellers are asked to provide estimates of future
price and quantities (both their own and their rival’s). This was done to prompt subjects
to think more about their best responses to their own predictions.
3. Theory and Experimental results
Our forward market experiments preserve the duopolistic oligopoly in the supply side
while maintaining a competitive demand side. Since buyers have no say in the final
(spot market) outcomes, their best option in the forward markets is to reveal their true
demand. If buyers purchase less than the equilibrium quantity during the forward
markets, then they will make less profit (buy less at a higher price). On the other hand,
what they can buy during the forward markets is limited by the sellers’ supply, so they
can never increase the quantity offered by the sellers. This effectively makes the
demand side competitive.
Below we first look at the results from our quantity setting duopolies. Then we
examine the exogenous and endogenous close forward markets. We evaluate hypotheses
concerning the effect of inertia caused by the initial quantity setting game on: profits
and surplus share, the no-arbitrage condition, and predictions under both EXO and
ENDO conditions.
3.1 Cournot duopolies.
The broad result from quantity setting experiments is that obtaining successful
collusion in oligopolies is difficult. Most experiments find that the non-cooperative
Nash-Cournot equilibrium is a good predictor of the quantity choices under random
matching (Holt, 1985; Huck et al., 2001; and Huck et al., 2004). Fouraker and Siegel
(1963) meanwhile showed that information on rival outputs and profits makes the
market more competitive. Successful collusion only sometimes emerges with duopolies
under fixed matching while quadropolies result in outcomes that are much more
competitive than predicted. Further, outcomes under asymmetric costs outcomes are
relatively more competitive (Mason et al., 1992; Fischer and Normann, 2019).
Both the endogenous and exogenous close treatments started with 25 periods of
quantity competition. We first checked whether there was any statistically significant
difference between the two subsamples and found none. We then pooled these data. We
We could only obtain 11 markets as these were more cumbersome and difficult to conduct compared to
the exogenous close and required longer durations.
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had a total 27 independently run Cournot oligopoly experiments, with an average
quantity of 54.11, which is 90.2% of the Nash-Cournot prediction of 60 (Table 2).
Using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the difference is statistically significant at 𝑝𝑝 =
0.01. Accordingly, relative to theory, prices and seller profits were lower and

consequently buyer surplus was higher. Of course, the differences with respect to

theoretical values were equally significant. These results are generally in line with other
experiments where it has been shown that fixed-pair duopolies sometimes collude
(Huck, S., Hans-Theo Normann and Jörg Oechssler, 2004).
Table 2

Summary statistics
Cournot-only periods (1-25)
Average (standard dev.)
Theory
Quantity

60

Price

42

Sellers’ surplus (market total)

1800

Buyers’ surplus (market total)

1800

Observed average
(standard deviation)
54.11
(8.23)
47.17
(8.19)
1622
(217,7)
1664.02
(435.35)

3.2 Exogenous close forward markets (EXO)
The model:
Alaz and Vila (1993) introduced a forward market in a Cournot model of
oligopolistic competition in the following way. Say two firms face a linear demand 𝑝𝑝 =
𝐴𝐴 − 𝑞𝑞 with zero costs. If, previous to this spot market, firms can sell forward, standard
Cournot analysis shows that, in equilibrium, Firm i will sell 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 =

𝐴𝐴−𝐹𝐹
3

in this spot

market, where 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓1 + 𝑓𝑓2 is the total of quantities sold in the forward market by both

firms. The equilibrium price is 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 =

𝐴𝐴−𝐹𝐹
3

. Knowing this, firms will choose their

quantities in the forward market solving
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠
s.t. 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 =

which gives

𝐴𝐴−𝐹𝐹
3

, 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 =

𝐴𝐴−𝐹𝐹
3

, and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 = 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 ,

𝐴𝐴

𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 = .
5
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If the forward market is open T times before the spot market, the equilibrium is
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 =

𝐴𝐴

3+2𝑇𝑇

, where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the forward quantity sold by Firm i in the forward

market at t. Total quantity (forward plus spot) is 𝑞𝑞 =

2+2𝑇𝑇
3+2𝑇𝑇

𝐴𝐴. Notice that price and total

quantity converge to the competitive case as T increases. Also, that the no-arbitrage

condition is imposed in the restrictions of the problem. In a previous work, Alaz (1992)
showed that a competitive demand side in the forward markets may be replaced with
this condition to get the same equilibrium price and quantities. Adding a positive
constant marginal cost, 𝑐𝑐, identical for both firms changes the formulae to 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 =
𝐴𝐴−𝑐𝑐

3+2𝑇𝑇

and 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐 =

𝐴𝐴−𝑐𝑐

3+2𝑇𝑇

. In the exogenous close experiment, we have 𝐴𝐴 = 102, 𝑇𝑇 = 2,

and 𝑐𝑐 = 12. Theoretical predictions, assuming passive automated buyers, are

summarized in Table 3. Note that F1 stands for the first forward market, F2 for the
second.

Table 3

Theoretical predictions:
2 forward-plus-spot periods (26-75)
F1
F2
Spot
Quantity (all sellers)
25.71
25.71
25.71
Price
24,86
24,86
24,86
Sellers’ surplus (all sellers)
330.76
330.76
330.76
Buyers’ surplus (all buyers)
1653.06
991.51
330.5

Total
77.14
992.28
2974.52

Below we list our hypotheses. Note, all hypotheses are based on the assumption that
buyers are passive which results in the no-arbitrage condition and gives us hypothesis 4.
Hypotheses-Exogenous Close (EXO)
Given the predictions from the theoretical models above we outline our testable
hypotheses for the exogenous close of 2 forward markets (EXO) below:
EXO1 - Output and prices
1a. Total quantity is higher than Cournot, while the price is lower.
1b. Quantity sold in each forward market and the spot market are equal.
EXO2 - Profits and surplus sharing
2a. Seller profits decrease while buyer profits increase relative to Cournot. The
predicted shares are 1/3:2/3.
2b. Total surplus generated is higher than in Cournot.
EXO3 - Inertia (implicit hypothesis)
3. Under the rationality assumption, theory predicts an equilibrium in the
Cournot-only periods which is different than in the forward+spot periods, with

14

no inertia from the initial Cournot phase into the subsequent EXO forward
market phase. We will test this rationality assumption vs adaptive behavior.
EXO4 – No-arbitrage condition
4. Prices in all forward and spot markets are equal.
EXO5 - Guesses
5. Subject price guesses are accurate.
EXO Results
EXO1 - Output and prices:
Given demand and costs, the theoretical prediction for the first 25 periods of
quantity setting duopolies is of 60, while Allaz and Vila’s prediction for the next 50
periods is 77.14, with 25.71 being shared equally across the two forward and spot
periods (Table 3). Figure 1 shows the average of the observed quantities for all periods.
The total quantity in the forward-plus-spot periods (periods 26-75) is not
significantly different from the Alaz and Vila theoretical prediction (77.14 vs. 78.91;
tables 3 and 4). A corollary of this result, that forward markets enhance competition, is
met. This can be seen easily if we formulate the null hypothesis that the total quantities
in the Cournot-only periods and in the forward-plus-spot periods is the same, which is
rejected with a p-value of zero in a one-sided test suggested by the model.
Next, we examine the division of quantity between the forward and spot markets
(in periods 26-75). Table 4 shows the summary of the results. According to the theory,
equilibrium quantities in every day are F1 = F 2 = Spot = 25.71. However, the
appropriate comparison is between the observed and the theoretical quantity in the
relevant subgame, given the observed quantity in the periods before. For example,
notice that the theoretical quantity for F1 is 25.71. However, the actual observed
quantity in the first forward market is 32.58. Given this, the equilibrium quantity in F2,
in the subgame after 32.58, is 22.96 (and not 25.71).14 These subgame-relevant
theoretical quantities are shown in Table 4.
Our tests show that quantities are close to theoretical predictions. In particular,
the hypothesis that Forward (F1+F2), Spot and Total quantities are equal to the
theoretical ones cannot be rejected. What differs from the theoretical result is how the
forward quantity is divided between the two forward markets: quantity in F1 is different

14

This would be the equilibrium quantity if subjects chose 25.71 in F1.
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from the theoretical quantity and the difference is not statistically significant (p-value of
0.1). While the hypothesis that in F2 the theoretical prediction is the same as the
observed average is rejected beyond a 1% of confidence.
Figure 1
Quantities per period exogenous close, EXO
100

80
60
40
20

0

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73
Average obs

Theory

Table 4

Experimental observations
EXO forward-plus-spot periods (26-75)
Average (standard dev.) */**/*** means reject Th=Obs at p=0.1/0.05/0.01
F1
F2
Spot
Total
32.59*
15.42 ***
30.9
78.91
Quantity
(13.82)
(5.39)
(10.75)
(9.16)
29.8**
23.99
23.33
Price
(8.13)
(5.83)
(8.65)
Sellers’ surplus (market
547.72***
237.56
316.32
1101.59**
total)
(256.1)
(146.82)
(465.47)
(324.84)
Buyers’ surplus (market
1473.9
884.65***
286.6***
2645.22***
total)
(697.2)
(394.37)
(215.1)
(472.04)

Result 1a: We reject the null hypothesis that overall quantity sold is equal to the
observed under Cournot competition. Hypothesis 1a is thus validated.
Result 1b: We do not reject the null hypothesis that the observed total forward quantity
is equal to the theoretical prediction. We reject the null hypothesis that the forward
quantity in the first day is equal to the forward quantity in the second day. Hypothesis
1b is partially validated.
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EXO2 - Profits and surplus sharing
A discussion on total surplus and surplus sharing is relevant especially in the
context of forward markets as they are supposed to result in competitive outcomes. We
find that the total surplus is very close to the ex-ante theoretical prediction. This was
expected as we already know that the total quantity is not significantly different from
the theoretical prediction.
Table 5

Quantity (all sellers)
Price
Sellers’ surplus (all sellers)
Buyers’ surplus (all
buyers)

Subgame-relevant theory predictions
EXO forward-plus-spot periods (26-75)
F1
F2
Spot
25.71
22.96
29.16
(5.53)
(10.64)
24.86
23.48
24.14
(2.76)
(5.04)
330.76
297.91
402.17
(130.27)
(218.19)
1653.06
502.73
774.77
(197.54)
(456.32)

Total ex-ante
77.14
992.28
2974.5

The share of the surplus for buyers and sellers, however, does not correspond to the
theoretical outcomes. Comparing the last two rows in tables 4 and 5, we see that, while
sellers make greater profits (1101 compared to 992), buyers make less (2645 compared
to 2974). Regardless, seller profits are much lower than those in the Cournot-only
scenario. In the same vein, buyer profits are also much higher than without forward
markets (the Cournot-only observed profits for sellers and buyers are 1622 and 1664,
respectively, as shown in Table 2). In other words, forward markets are beneficial to
buyers even if sellers take a higher than theoretical share of the surplus. As we see next,
in the study of the inertia hypothesis, this discrepancy with the theory is higher in the
earlier periods of the experiment. During the later periods, the sharing of profits tends
toward the theoretical distribution (see Figure 2).
Result 2a: We reject the null hypotheses that the seller share of the surplus does not
decline with respect to the Cournot and that the buyer share does not increase.
Hypothesis 2a is validated.
Result 2b: We cannot reject the null hypothesis that total observed profits are equal to
the theoretical prediction. Hypothesis 2b is validated.

17

EXO3 - Inertia
In Ferreira et al. (2015), which lacked a prior Cournot-only phase, no particular
effect was found in the total quantities during the first periods of play. By contrast,
Brandts et al. (2006) do find that some learning is needed until subjects’ behavior
stabilizes after ten periods. However, they use a more complicated market simulation
with they introduce quadratic costs. In our experiments forward markets are introduced
after subjects had played twenty-five rounds of Cournot. We can check whether this
results in inertia, i.e., whether the behavior from Cournot markets carries over to the
forward market phase.
Looking only at quantity choices, the hypothesis that there is a positive slope in
the total quantities in the forward plus spot markets periods is rejected. Hence, no
inertia is detected. A simple regression shows a slope of -0.0005, which is not
significantly different from zero. If there is any inertia, it lasts only for the first period
(average total quantity = 70.94), while in the second period the average increases to 82.
Recall that the average total quantity for all periods is 79.91. However, we do find that
prices show some inertia in the forward stages, with prices being higher in the early
periods than in the later ones.
Another way of presenting the information is embedded in the way profits are
divided between buyers and sellers. Since quantities do not show inertia, and since
profits are calculated multiplying net price times quantities, total profits will not show
inertia, but the manner in which profits are split reflect any inertia due to prices.
Figure 2 shows that there is indeed some inertia in relation to profits. During the
25 Cournot-only periods, sellers obtain an average of 811 each, while buyers get 832
(theoretical Cournot profits are 900 for each buyer and each seller). In the forward-plusspot periods, sellers make an average profit of 550 and buyers make 1323 (theoretical
predictions are 496 and 1487 respectively). For sellers, profits decrease steadily for 10
weeks until they settle around the average. For buyers there is a corresponding increase.
For the total number of weeks, a simple regression analysis shows a significant slope of
-4.34 for sellers’ profits and of 12.28 for buyers.
Result 3: Our results reject the null hypothesis that there is no inertia in the sharing of
profits, but do not reject the null hypothesis that there is no inertia in quantities. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 is partially validated.
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EXO4 – No-arbitrage condition
Of special importance is whether the no-arbitrage hypothesis, that asserts that
prices in all markets must be equal, is satisfied. We find that prices are close to
theoretical, although the exact prediction is not met for F1 (Table 4). The data show
arbitrage opportunities between F1 and F2 (𝑝𝑝 = 0.01), and between F1 and the Spot

market (𝑝𝑝 = 0.05). No arbitrage possibilities are found between F2 and the Spot. We

thus reject the no-arbitrage hypothesis between F1 and F2 and, F1 and the spot market.
These results are presented in Table 6.

Table 6

Observed
Tests
29,8
F1
F1=F2*** F1=Spot**
(8.13)
23.99
F2
F2=Spot
(5.83)
23.33
Spot
(8.65)
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Result 4: The hypothesis that prices are the same in all days of a week, is rejected: there
are significant arbitrage opportunities between F1 and F2 (p=0.01), and between F1
and the Spot market (p=0.05).
EXO5: Guesses
As earlier mentioned, sellers were asked to estimate quantities, whereas buyers
were asked to estimate prices. Even though these were not incentivized, asking
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participants for guesses can potentially help in decision making as it forces the
participants to think about future earnings. Tables 7 and 8 summarize these results.
The total quantities guessed at F1 are closer to the actual quantities than the total
quantities guessed at F2 where the difference is statistically significant. This is
surprising since at F2 subjects have more information than at F1. Subjects show
systematic overconfidence in the quantities they “think you will sell” relative to the
quantities they “think your rival will sell”. Given that their actual sales are lower than
what they guess and closer to equilibrium values, it seems like they are thinking more
optimistically than they are acting.
Buyers underestimate the price in the Cournot-only weeks, where they take no
action. They make better guesses in the forward+spot periods, where they are active.
However, the fact that buyers can guess the price in F2 when they are at F1 is at odds
with the fact that there are arbitrage opportunities between these two markets, as shown
earlier. It seems that they predict the future price better than they anticipate the current
price. This is contrary to the result for quantities where guesses in F1 are better than in
F2. There seems to be a clear difference between how they guess prices vs quantities.
Result 5: We reject the null hypothesis that guessed prices and quantities are equal to
actual ones. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not validated: sellers overstate their quantity guesses
while buyers understate prices. Buyers seem to predict future prices better than present.

Table 7
Sellers’ quantity guesses
Rival’s Q in Cournot only
(standard dev)

Actual
27.7
(7.54)
Actual

Total market Q in
Cournot +Forward
Own total Q
Other’s total Q

78.9
(9.2)
39,5
(13,3)
39,5
(13,3)

Guessed at
F1
81.2***
(10.7)
45***
(14.4)
36.2***
(12.2)

Table 8
Buyers’ price guesses
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Guessed
15.9***
(10.23)
Guessed
at F2
85.1***
(12)
47.5***
(14.6)
37.7***
(12.6)

Price in Cournot only
Price for F2 (in F1)
Price for Spot (in F2)

Actual
46.7
(8.0)
24.1
(5.8)
23.1
(8.6)

Guessed
42.7***
(10.3)
25.2
(9.13)
18.1***
(8.8)

3.3. Theory and results endogenously close (ENDO)
Allaz and Vila (1993) show that, as the number of forward markets increases, total
quantity and price approach the perfectly competitive ones. On the other hand, Ferreira
(2003) argues that if the forward market has infinitely many moments in which trade is
allowed, any price (and quantity) between Cournot and perfect competition can be
sustained in equilibrium. As in many other instances, the limit of the equilibria in finite
games may not exhaust all the equilibria in the infinite game. In fact, something similar
to a Folk Theorem is obtained if the infinite case is analyzed directly. In this case, any
total quantity and corresponding market price between competitive and Cournot can be
observed in equilibrium.
Note that the Cournot result can be supported in equilibrium by the following
strategy. Firms sell nothing in the forward markets and play standard Cournot in the
spot market. If a firm deviates and sells forward at some point, the other firms also sell
in the next period. When one firm sells forward, it makes some extra profits with
respect to the equilibrium behavior. However, when the other firms also sell in the next
period to punish the deviation, its profits are reduced. The punishment phase is
calibrated so the deviator makes a net loss. Ferreira (2003) shows that similar strategies
can actually support any outcome between the competitive and the Cournot quantities.
However, the Cournot outcome is the only one that satisfies some equilibrium
refinements like renegotiation-proofness or Pareto perfection.
Notice that after firms sell in the forward market, each of the subgames is a
reduced version of the original game (with a smaller residual demand, depending on
how much was sold in the previous markets). This makes the model different from a
repeated game because, in the repeated game, the demand remains the same in each
period. There is, however, a similar result once it is established that there is still room
for credible punishments in spite of the smaller demand and of the smaller impact of the
punishment.
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For operational reasons, we implement an adaptation of the specification in
Ferreira (2003). As we cannot have infinitely many forward markets periods in our
experimental setup, we replace the condition in the model with the following
adaptation: a forward market is opened in day 1, beginning with day 𝑡𝑡 = 2, a new

forward market is opened in day t, as long as total trades during day 𝑡𝑡 − 1 were

positive. Otherwise, the forward market phase closes and day t becomes the spot

market. This adaption implements an indefinitely repeated version of Ferreira (2003)

that, as we show below, does not change the predictions.
Our second implementation adaptation has to do with the integer problem, as
subjects cannot enter quantities with decimals. This changes the model, but only in the
sense that the results in Ferreira (2003) are approximations of the results in the model
with the integer restriction. For the sake of completeness, we now show that under the
endogenous close rule both Cournot and competitive prices can be sustained in a
subgame perfect equilibrium in the adapted model in the same fashion as they are
sustained in the original model.
The theory:
Again, note that the theory assumes that buyers are passive. This is essential to
obtaining the no-arbitrage hypothesis. Now, consider the case of one forward market
before the spot market with demand given by 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑞 where n is a natural number.

The forward market opens at discrete times, and each time firms can choose to sell any
amount in the market (after observing the previous positions). A forward market opens
at time 𝑡𝑡 if some quantity was traded at 𝑡𝑡 − 1, otherwise period t becomes the spot
market. Firms’ strategy choices are 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑛𝑛}, where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the forward

quantity sold by Firm i in forward period t and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the spot quantity sold by Firm i.
The Competitive Equilibrium

In the forward market firms play the following manner:
(i)
(ii)

Firm i chooses 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =

Firm i chooses 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =

∑𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 ≥ 2 and odd,

(iii)

𝑛𝑛−∑𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
2

if 𝑛𝑛 − ∑𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 ≥ 2 and even,

𝑛𝑛−∑𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1+1
2

, and Firm j chooses 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 =

𝑛𝑛−∑𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1−1
2

, if 𝑛𝑛 −

Firm i chooses 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1, and Firm j chooses 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 0 if 𝑛𝑛 − ∑𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 = 1,
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(iv)

both firms choose 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0 if 𝑛𝑛 − ∑𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 = 0.

In the spot market firms play Cournot in the residual demand which, in the

equilibrium path, is 𝑠𝑠1 = 𝑠𝑠2 = 0. In all cases, forward and spot market prices are 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 =
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝 = 0, and profits are also zero. Given the strategy chosen by one’s opponent,

changing the forward quantities does not change the price and no positive profits can be
expected in any market.

The Cournot Equilibrium
In the forward market firms play:
(ii)

𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖1 = 0,

(iii)

in the spot market play Cournot in the residual demand so, in the equilibrium path,

(i)

at 𝑡𝑡 > 1 play as in the competitive equilibrium,
𝑛𝑛

firms play one of the integers closest to .
3

Clearly, by following the strategy, firms get a non-negative profit (positive if
𝑛𝑛 ≥ 3). Any deviation in the forward market results in zero profits. In the spot market

firms play according to the Cournot equilibrium.
Hypotheses-Endogenous close.

The alternative theoretical models yield the following testable hypotheses for the
Endogenous (ENDO) number of forward markets. In all hypotheses below (i) gives the
competitive prediction, and (ii) gives the Cournot prediction.
ENDO1- 6a: Output and Prices
6a-i: Equal the competitive outcome.
6a-ii: Equal the Cournot outcome.
6b: Forward market use:
6b-i: All quantity is sold in forward markets at marginal cost.
6b-ii: All quantity is sold only in the spot market at the Cournot price.
ENDO2 - Surplus and surplus sharing
Relative to the exogenously determined number of forward markets:
7-i: Total surplus will be higher.
7-ii: Total surplus will be lower with surplus shared equally by buyers
and sellers.
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ENDO3 - Inertia
8: No inertia when transitioning from spot only periods to forward-plusspot periods. This is an implicit hypothesis as the theory gives different
equilibria under each market condition, assuming rationality. We will test
this rationality assumption vs adaptive behaviour.
ENDO4 – No-arbitrage condition
9a-i: Prices in all forward markets are equal.
9b-ii: There is no use of the forward market, and no prices are defined
there.
ENDO5 - Guesses
10. Assuming subjects have rational expectations, their price guesses are
correct.
Results
ENDO1 - Output and prices
We find that the endogenous close treatment yields competitive outcomes (Table
9). This could be due to the fact that coordinating on output is difficult in the
endogenous close environment. Figure 3 shows the average observations of the
Cournot-only (first 25 periods) and the forward-plus-Cournot (last 50 periods) phases of
the experiment. In 3, we can see that the theoretical quantity is the Cournot quantity for
the first 25 periods and the perfect competition quantity for the last 50 periods (these
quantities are 60 and 90, respectively). Although the theory allows for multiple
equilibria, the observed data suggest that our results favor the competitive outcome.
Table 9

+

Theory and observation
forward-plus-spot periods (26-75)
Perfect
Cournot
competition
Quantity (all sellers)
60
90
Price
42
12

Observation
83.26
27.98+

There is a different price for every forward and spot openings. Here we show the
average price weighted by the quantities.

We now look at the Alaz and Vila, and the Cournot hypotheses in the
forward+spot market periods. According to theory, there are a multiplicity of equilibria
in the endogenous close model, of which, the more salient and extreme ones that yield
the competitive and Cournot outcomes. In all the competitive equilibria, which is the
limit of the finite Alaz and Vila model, the price is equal to the marginal cost in all
forward markets and the residual demand for the spot market is zero. The Cournot
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outcome is achieved if subjects refrain from using the forward market and go directly to
compete a la Cournot in the spot market.
Figure 3: Quantities per period: endogenous close
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While the Cournot hypothesis is strongly rejected (1% significant level), we
weakly reject the competitive hypothesis (5% significance level). The average total
quantity sold is 83.26, which is 92.5% of the competitive quantity of 90, but well above
the Cournot quantity of 60. This average total quantity is equivalent to the theoretical
quantity of a Cournot spot market with six previous periods of forward markets.15
A pro-competitive hypothesis -that the opening of forward markets results in
higher total quantity than the Cournot quantity- is validated. More precisely, the test
that the quantity in the Cournot plus forward periods is no smaller than the quantity in
the Cournot-only periods is rejected. Furthermore, the aggregate quantities observed are
significantly higher and prices lower (both at 𝑝𝑝 = 0.01) than in the exogenous close

case, further supporting a pro-competitive hypothesis for additional forward markets.
Now, we look at the division between the forward and spot markets under the

endogenous close of forward markets. As mentioned before, in the endogenous close
model, the competitive outcome is one of the multiple equilibrium possibilities. In all
the equilibria that give the competitive outcome, the price is zero in all forward markets
and the residual demand for the spot market is zero. The way the competitive quantity is

15

Solving for T in the formula for the total quantity: 83.26 =
25

2+2𝑇𝑇

3+2𝑇𝑇

90.

shared among the different forward market openings is undetermined, although the limit
of the finite versions of the game yields a uniform distribution. The Cournot outcome is
only achieved if subjects refrain from using the forward market and go directly to
compete a la Cournot in the spot market. Neither case is observed. What we observed is
an average of total forward positions of 58.22 and an average of spot sales of 25.04. As
seen in Figure 3, although both quantities fluctuate across the periods, the sum is
remarkably constant around the average of 83.26.
Figure 3
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Now consider the Cournot hypothesis in the spot market. After the forward
markets close, the spot market becomes a Cournot game, where firms decide how much
quantity to sell to the residual passive demand. The average aggregate forward
quantities sold is 58.22, leaving an average residual demand of 25.04 for the spot
market, compared to the theoretical competitive and Cournot quantities of 31.78 and
21.19, respectively. The difference with the theoretical Cournot after the observed
quantities sold in the forward markets is only marginally statistically significant (5%
level, Wilcoxon rank sum test- Table 10). One can see that in Table 10, where the
Theory column is the Cournot equilibrium in the Cournot-only periods, and perfect
competition in the forward-plus-spot periods. The column Theory in the subgame is the
Cournot equilibrium in the spot market after 58.22 units sold in the forward markets.
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This quantity varies as different duopolies sell different quantities in the forward
markets.
It is interesting to note that the same subjects who under-competed in the
Cournot-only periods, over-compete in the spot market, which is also a Cournot game.
It seems that having competed in the forward markets induces sellers to compete more
in the Cournot spot market. Looking at the distribution of the forward market quantities
we find that the average market quantity is not uniform (i.e., equally distributed). About
half of the forward market sales are conducted in the first market. Posterior openings of
the forward market register about half the sales of the previous opening. Figure 4
provides the average sales per market opening, where forward markets are openings 1
through 11, and the spot market is opening 12 (in no case did the forward market open
more than 11 times). This is different from the findings in the experiments with no
active buyers, where no quantities were left to trade in the spot market, as the
competitive quantity was already sold in the forward markets (Ferreira et al., 2016). We
summarize our results below.
Table 10

Theory and observations
Endogenous close
Theory

Theory in the
subgame

60

-

Total forward
quantities

90

-

Spot quantities

0

21.19
(13.68)

Total quantities

90

-

Cournot-only periods

Forward-plus-spot
periods

Observation
50.99
(9.54)
58.22
(20.54)
25.04**
(15.24)
83.26
(10.4)

Result 6a: The null hypothesis that the observed quantity is the competitive one is
weakly rejected, while the null hypothesis that the observed quantity is the Cournot
outcome is strongly rejected. Quantity is significantly higher and prices lower than in
the exogenous case supporting a pro-competitive hypothesis for additional forward
markets.
Result 6b: The null hypotheses (6b-i) that the forward, and (6b-ii) spot quantities are
respectively zero is rejected. We observe sales in both forward and spot markets.
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ENDO2 - Surplus sharing
Total quantity is closer to perfect competition than to theoretical Cournot, and
consequently, so are other variables. A competitive output results in higher efficiency
with the observed market surplus being 3928, while the competitive and Cournot
market surpluses are 4050 and 3600, respectively. The total surplus is much closer to
perfect competition (marginally significant at 5% levels) than to Cournot. According to
the model, perfect competition would imply that all the surplus goes to the buyer, while
Cournot would imply an equal share. However, the observed profits are 2598 for the
buyers (1299 each), and 1330 for the sellers (665 each), which is very close to 1/3 for
sellers and 2/3 for the buyers. Thus, although the forward markets make trade very
competitive, the sellers find a way to maintain a big part of the surplus they enjoyed
without them. This is shown in Table 11. Below we present our results.
Figure 4
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Result 7-i:
• The null hypothesis that total surplus is not higher than under exogenous close
is rejected (and, a fortiori, the hypothesis that the surplus is not higher than in
Cournot is also rejected).
• The null hypothesis that the total surplus is equal to the competitive outcome is
rejected.
• The null hypothesis that sellers obtain no surplus is also rejected, although
buyers obtain more surplus than sellers (2/3 vs 1/3 respectively).
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Result 7-ii:
• The null hypothesis that total surplus is equal to the Cournot outcome is
rejected.
• The null that the surplus is shared equally by buyers and sellers is also rejected.
• Both the Cournot and competitive hypotheses on surplus sharing are rejected,
however, total surplus and surplus share are closer to perfect competition.
Table 11

Theory and observation

Cournot-only periods

Forward-plus-spot periods

Sellers’
surplus
Buyers’
surplus
Sellers’
surplus
Buyers’
surplus
Total surplus

Cournot

Perfect
competition

1800

-

1800

-

1800

0

1800

4050

3600

4050

Observation
1579.46
(190.77)
1728.3
(402.34)
1330.73
(209.99)
2597.94
(256.83)
3928.67**
(272.02)

** all observations are significantly different from quantities in any hypothesis at 0.01, except observed
total surplus vs total surplus under perfect competition, which is rejected only at 0.05.

ENDO3 - The inertia hypothesis
As in the exogenous close case, no inertia is detected, and the hypothesis that
there is a positive slope in the total quantities in the forward plus spot markets periods is
rejected. The function of total quantities with respect to time has a slope of 0.00067,
which is not significantly different from zero. If there is any inertia, it quickly
disappears after two periods (with average quantities of 71.36 and 78.36). In the third
period of forward plus spot markets, the total quantity average is already 82.64, very
close to 83.26, the average for all periods.
There is some inertia in the sharing of profits once players enter in the periods of
forward plus spot markets. Profits during the Cournot-only periods are close to the
theoretical prediction, but lower, as we also saw in the exogenous case (in this case,
sellers make an average of 790 each, and buyers an average of 864, while the theoretical
Cournot profits are 900 each). The observed inertia is a small, but steady decline of the
sellers’ surplus. A simple linear regression to fit the 50 periods of forward-plus-spot
periods give a slope of -3.03, which is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.002
and errors normally distributed (p-value of 0.15). See Figure 5.
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Result 8: No inertia is detected for quantities, with no positive slope being detected in
the forward and spot markets. Inertia is, however, observed for seller profits with
profits steadily declining.
ENDO4 - The no-arbitrage hypothesis
Parallel to what we observed with quantities, prices decrease along openings of
the forward markets following the quantities to increase in the spot market. This is
shown in Figure 6, where 1-11 are the forward market openings, and 12 is the Spot
market. The no-arbitrage hypothesis is rejected from one opening of the market to the
next, except between the openings 6 and 7. Not surprisingly, due to the decreasing
prices that start above the spot market price and end below, only the prices in central
forward market openings are not significantly different from the spot market price.
Buyers should have bought more quantities in the later periods, and sellers should have
been less patient. This is shown in Table 11, where only the first 8 opening markets are
shown, as not all oligopolies have openings after that, and we lose data points.
Result 9: The no-arbitrage hypothesis is rejected.
ENDO5 - Guesses
As in the exogenous close treatment, in the endogenous close, buyers were asked to
guess future prices and sellers were asked to guess both prices and quantities16 at all
market openings. Recall that in every period, futures markets open as long as they are
used. If at a given opening of the futures market there is no trade, then the futures
market closes and the game goes to the spot market, thus finishing that period.
Therefore, different oligopolies will have a different number of opening of the futures
market. To pool the data for the different oligopolies, we proceed as in the case of the
actual prices and consider that for the days the futures market is not open, the guesses
are the same in the last day it opened. These guesses show the same decreasing
tendency as markets open until the last opening of futures markets. The most
remarkable difference is that subjects never anticipate the increase in the price for the
spot market. The most likely explanation is that they fail to anticipate that the futures
markets will close the next period, and that they always make their guesses thinking that

16

They were not rewarded for anticipating them correctly.
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the future market will open one more period. No guesses are asked during the spot
market.
Figure 5
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Compared to the actual prices, guesses are consistently lower at the beginning, and
higher at the end of the period, with the exception of the last guess as discussed above.
In addition, we observe that seller’s guesses are consistently lower than buyers. Guesses
show a lower variability compared to actual prices. Still, subjects are aware that prices
will decline, although they do not take full advantage and buy later or sell earlier. This
is shown in Table 13 and Figure 7. Also guesses did not improve with the passing of the
weeks as the experiment advanced. A simple regression analysis for the guesses in each
31

day against the week of the experiment shows a very small, non-statistically significant,
slope, sometimes positive and sometimes negative.
Table 12

Observed prices per opening and arbitrage among them
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6
F7
26.8
22.6
17.3
15
9.6
10.9
(7.3)
(10.3)
(10.1)
(8.4)
(3.7)
(5.9)
F2=F3
F3=F4
F4=F5
F5=F6
F6=F7
F7=F8
***
***
**
***
***

F1
34.7
(11.3)
F1=F2
***
F1=Spot
***

F2=Spot
***

F3=Spot
**

F4=Spot

F5=Spot

F6=Spot

F7=Spot
**

F8
4
(3.7)

Spot
17.5
(11.9)

F8=Spot
***

Table 13
Actual vs guessed price
F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

F10

F11

34.66

26.77

22.55

17.34

15.02

9.6

10.94

4.04

3.23

2.37

1.12

Buyer’
guess

21.1

17.34

14.07

11.52

9.11

7.72

6.93

5.92

6.28

6.2

6.15

Seller’s
guess

15.8

12.29

9.35

8.29

7.12

6.03

4.91

4.29

4.55

3.51

3.56

Actual
price

F12

Sellers were also asked to make guesses about their own and the rival’s
quantities. One of these guesses is about the total quantity they thought they will be
selling in the market (both in the forward and spot markets), and they could update their
guess at every forward market opening. These guesses did not change too much from
one market opening to the next, probably they just made a first guess and made only
minor adjustments (if any) in the subsequent market openings. They guessed an average
of 50.83 units, while the average actual value was 41.63, showing optimistic
expectations that did not decrease as the experiment progressed. The average rivals’
expected production, 42.89, is very close to the actual choices. Thus, individuals think
they will sell more than the rival, a quantity that they correctly foresee, and fail to see
themselves as they are seen by the rival.
Result 10: The null hypotheses that quantity and price guesses are correct are rejected.
Subject price guesses are consistently lower at the beginning, and higher at the end of
the sequence of forward markets. Participants never anticipate the increase in the price
for the spot market. Similar to the exogenous case, sellers guess that they will sell more
than the rival.
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Figure 7
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4. Conclusion
While the procompetitive effects of forward markets as proposed by Allaz and Vila
(1993) are by now quite well documented in the experimental literature, our
experiments advance the present literature by making two improvements to the wellknown structure. First, our subjects participate in a series of Cournot spot market
duopolies previous to the introduction of the forward markets. This is done to establish
a foundation for the real-world phenomenon where forward markets are introduced in
existing spot markets. This allows us to study whether there is any inertia between the
Cournot-only spot markets and markets that include forward positions. Second, and
more importantly, we introduce real buyers in the forward markets. This allows us to
test the assertion in Allaz (1992) who showed that having active buyers is equivalent to
passive buyers plus the no-arbitrage hypothesis.
Experimental results refute both our hypotheses. Our experimental results
clearly show that the no-arbitrage hypothesis is not satisfied with active buyers. We do,
however, observe competitive levels of output in the forward market phase. Subjects
behave close to theory in the Cournot spot only phase and sell about 90% of theoretical
Nash equilibrium prediction. In the case of the exogenous close, with two periods of
forward markets, we find total quantity observed is closer to the theoretical prediction,
demonstrating a pro-competitive effect of the forward market. While, the way the
forward quantity is divided between the two forward markets is not as the theory
predicts, the total quantity divided between the forward and spot markets is close to
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theory. The proportion in which total surplus is divided between sellers and buyers is
close to the theoretical prediction: this clearly benefits the buyers.
We do not observe any significant inertia between the first phase of Cournotonly spot competition and the following phase in which forward markets are added.
Subjects adapt quickly. Importantly, the no-arbitrage condition is not satisfied. In theory
there cannot be arbitrage, but, as reflected by their own guesses, subjects seem to be
aware of the differences in prices between markets during the experiment. However,
they are unable to fully adapt their behavior to that knowledge. Although they do not act
optimally on their guesses as they sell less, sellers remain optimistic with regard to the
quantities they will sell.
The endogenous case has indefinitely many forward markets. This implies that
we have multiple equilibria according to the theory, with the Cournot and the
competitive ones being the extremes. Our experiments provide results that are
somewhere in between the two salient predictions, but much closer to the competitive
outcome. Therefore, total surplus is also much closer to perfect competition than to
Cournot.
However, the observed price, as an average over the forward and spot markets,
is midway between the Cournot and the perfect competition price, and higher than the
price given by the demand at the observed quantity of 83.26. This is possible because
the quantities in the forward markets are sold at high prices. In the perfectly competitive
equilibrium, all the surplus goes to the buyer. However, we find that in the experiment
sellers manage to maintain 1/3 of the total surplus as sellers manage to keep the price up
for the units they sale in the forward markets.
In the perfectly competitive equilibrium sellers should sell everything in the
forward markets, however, our experimental sellers abandon the forward market when
there is some residual demand that is then satisfied in the spot market. Almost a third of
the total quantity is sold in the spot market (in the Cournot equilibrium, all sales occur
in the spot market). Again, we find almost no inertia, as subjects adapt very quickly
from the Cournot-only markets to the addition of forward markets. Subjects seem to be
aware of the price difference among the different market openings but do not take full
advantage of this, with the result that the no-arbitrage condition is not satisfied. Sellers
anticipate correctly their rivals’ total sale quantities, but over-optimistically predict they
will sell more than they do.
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Appendix-Instructions
Instructions (Buyers)-EXOGENOUS
Page 1
Introduction
This is an experiment on decision-making. You can earn money if you follow the
instructions and make decisions carefully. You will be paid in cash at the end of the
session. You can raise your hand to ask questions related to the experiment at any time.
Page 2

Overview

You will be a buyer in this experiment. There are #NumSellers# sellers and
#NumBuyers# buyers in your market.
This experiment is divided into two parts. During the first part, you will not be making
any decisions, but you will be able to learn about the experiment. In the second part,
you will be making decisions. Paying close attention during the first part will help you
make better choices during the second part.
First we will explain Part I of the experiment and then we will explain your computer
screen. Finally, we will explain Part II of the experiment.
Page 3

Part I Instructions

As a buyer, you will not make any buying decisions during Part I. You will simply
observe #numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks of seller decisions and your computer will
automatically buy units for you.
During Part I, each seller will independently decide how many units to sell. The total
quantity of units that the sellers decide to sell will dictate the price.
•
•

If sellers choose to sell only a few units, the market price will be high.
If sellers choose to sell a lot of units, the market price will be low.

Once all the sellers decide how many units to sell, you will see the total amount of units
the sellers chose to sell and the corresponding market price.
Page 4 [Load Figure 1 on client interface]
What is your Demand?
Each week you are assigned a certain number of units which give you value. For
example, suppose you have value for 3 units. The first unit gives you a value of 25, the
second unit gives you a value of 15 and the last unit gives you a value of 5.
Your demand can then be graphically represented with three steps as shown on the
right.

1

Figure 1

Value
Your
demand

25

15

5
Quantity
1

2

3

Page 5 [Load figure 2]
Suppose that the market price is 8, represented by the line that crosses at 8. It shows you
whether the market price is higher or lower than your unit values. Your profits are shown
by the shaded area.
Your profit for each unit equals your value (25, 15, or 5) minus the market price (8) you
must pay. Because the value of your third unit (5) is worth less than the market price (8),
you should not buy it. Your earnings are shown as the shaded portion of the graph and
can be calculated as:
(25-8) + (15-8) = 17 + 7 = 24
You make money in this experiment by purchasing units that have values above the
market price.

2

Figure 2

Price & Value
25

Your
demand

15

Market Price

8
5
1

2

Quantity

3

Page 6 [Load Figure 3]
Multi-Unit Demand
You will actually have values for many more than 3 units, unlike our simple example
above. Because there will be so many units demanded (50 in the following example), you
will no longer be able to distinguish the individual steps in the graph, but the interpretation
of this multi-unit demand is exactly the same as before:
Figure 3

Price
unit 1 has a value of 100
100
unit 15 has a value of 70
70
unit 35 has a value of 30
30
0
1

15

35

50

3

Quantity

Page 7 [Load figure 4]
Maximizing Profit
Remember, during Part I your computer will automatically buy the quantity that gives
you the highest earnings. If your demand is like the one in the graph and the market
price is 20, then your computer will buy 40 units, because each of those units has a
value greater than 20. The shaded area would represent your total earnings of 1600,
which is 40 units times an average profit of ½ × (100-20).
Figure 4

Price
Your
deman

100

Market Price

20
40

50

Quantity

Page 8 [Show Computer Status Box]
Your Computer Screen
Now that we have explained Part I of the experiment, let’s discuss your computer
screen. Throughout the experiment, the Status Box will always be on the top-right part
of your computer screen.
The Status box will show you the:
•
•
•

Time Remaining in each Day
Week number
Your earnings in dollars

In Part 1, there will be # numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks.

4

Page 9 [Show My Choice Box, let the user interface with the screen, have Ready to
Go On button enabled instead of Next Button]
Your Computer Screen
The numbers in the My Choice Box at the bottom of your screen provide you with
information about the relationship between the quantity you buy, the market price, and
your profit.
On this screen during Part I, you may enter your estimate of the next market price. This
will have no effect on your earnings whatsoever, but it will help you learn to accurately
estimate prices which will be needed during Part II.
•

If your estimate is correct, then the numbers you see will show the exact
quantity you will buy and the earnings you will make when your computer
automatically buys the quantity that maximizes your earnings.

•

If the actual market price is higher than your estimate, then both the quantity you
buy and your earnings will be lower than what you estimated.

•

If the actual market price is lower than your estimate, then both the quantity you
buy and your earnings will be higher than what you estimated.

The green shaded area gives the size of your earnings for the estimated price and
quantity.
Page 10 [End part I instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the first part of the experiment. Please wait
patiently while the remaining participants finish.

[DO PART I]
[When Part I is finished, send notification to client and begin Part II instructions]
Page 11 [Load Weeks and Days boxes instead of Week Num. in Client Status Box]
Instructions for Part II
Now we will explain Part II of the experiment. There will be #numPart2Weeks# weeks
during Part II. Each week is divided into #numDays# days. You will have an
opportunity to purchase units in each day of the week.

5

You must make decisions about how to distribute your purchases across the different
days of the week, given your total demand.
If you decide to buy some units before the last day of the market week, then these units
will be subtracted from your total demand.
On the last day of the market your computer will automatically buy every unit of
demand that you have remaining that has a value above the market price. This
maximizes your profit.
Notice that the market price may be different each day of the market week, and you are
always better off buying at low rather than high prices.
Page 12 [Load Figure 5]
Week Example
Say you begin with a demand for 50 units, and on day 1 you buy 10 units at a price of
40. Suppose that on day 2 you buy 15 more units at a price of 20.
Your remaining demand for the rest of the week is 25 units (50-10-15), with the highest
remaining units valued at 50 and the lowest one valued at 0. Your remaining demand is
represented on the graph to the right by the blue part of the original demand.
Also notice in the graph you can see the quantity you purchased and what price you
paid for day 1 and day 2. Finally, your profits for day 1 (500) and day 2 (675) are
shaded in gray and green respectively.
Figure 5

6

Page 13
How You Buy Units
To buy units (except on the last day), you must enter both a quantity and the price per
unit that you are willing to pay for exactly that many units.
•

If the market price is the same as the price you submitted, you will buy exactly
the quantity you asked for.

•

If the market price is lower than the price you submitted, then you will buy
more than the quantity you asked for.

•

If the market price is higher than the price you submitted, then you will buy less
than the quantity you asked for.

Page 14

How is the Market Price Determined?

The market price is determined by comparing the prices you and other buyers are
willing to pay for units to the price the sellers are willing the sell their units, and finding
the single “market” price that maximizes the number of sales.
Page 15 [Load Figure 6]
How You Buy Units
Now let’s go through an example. Suppose you have a total demand for at most 50
units, and you submit a price of 30 and a quantity of 20 on the first day. That
information creates your submitted demand, shown with the dark blue line. Your
actual purchase will always be somewhere along the dark blue line that represents your
submitted demand. Notice your submitted demand says that you would be willing to
purchase 1 unit at a price of 50, or 2 units at a price of 49, …or 20 units at a price of 30,
... or 50 units at a price of 1.
Figure 6

Price
Your true demand
100
Your submitted demand
(your purchase must be
somewhere along this line)

50
30

20

50
7

Quantity

Page 16
You are not required to purchase units every day. But you make the largest
profit by buying units on the day or days when the price is the lowest.
Page 17 [Load figure 7]
Daily Market Results
Suppose that on the first day you actually buy 15 units at a price of 35. For the next day
the screen will display a graph like the one you see to the right. In the graph, the past
results are shown as grayed out with the darker area showing your previous day’s profit.
Your remaining demand for the rest of the days in the market is shown in color:
Figure 7

Page 18 [Show the entire My Choice Box]
Complete Screen Image
Notice the My Choice Box at the bottom right of the screen. It provides you with
information about quantity, price, and earnings from day to day.
To help you make your decisions, the screen shows you information about the past days
(grayed out), and allows you to enter your quantity and price for today (except on the
last day), and also allows you to make an estimate about the future market price.
As you try different combinations of these numbers, you can see what your expected
future quantity purchased and earnings would be. If you don’t press the “submit” button
to finally submit your demand (quantity and price) for the current day, it will be
assumed that you do not want to buy anything today.
8

On the last day of the market you will not be able to submit your demand (quantity and
price) as your computer will automatically buy any of your remaining true demand that
has a value above the market price.
Page 19 [Allow subjects to follow steps laid out in pg. 19 – pg 21]
We will now walk you through a 3-day practice week. Please follow the instructions as
they may help you understand how to participate in Part II of this experiment.
Page 20
•

You begin in Day 1 of the three day market week.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 40.
o This means you are estimating that today’s price will be lower than the
future price (40 > 30), so you might try buying something today.

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 20.
o The numbers in the “Today” line mean that if the actual price today is
30, you will buy the 20 units you entered, and will make earnings of 980.

•

The numbers in the “Future” line show that 10 units will be your best purchase
on the last day if the future price on that day turns out to be 40, and you buy
nothing else in addition to today’s purchase before the last day. It also shows the
earnings (90) that you can expect to make on the last day if your entries are
accurate.

•

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.

9

Page 21
•

Notice that the actual price was 24 (less than you estimated), so you bought 26
units (more than you estimated), and you made 1300 in earnings (more than
your expected earnings of 980). These numbers appear in the “Past” line.

•

Now you are in Day 2, and must again choose a price and a quantity. Notice that
your estimated price for today is set at 24 (yesterday’s market price) by default.
Now you may change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 25.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 30 (this implies that you are estimating
that today’s price will be lower than the future price (25 < 30)).

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 9. Press SUBMIT now.

Page 22
•

Notice that the market price was 35 (more than you estimated) so you bought
only 3 units (<9) and made 7.5 in earnings.

•

You are now in the last market day, day 3. On the last day, the only thing you
can do is to estimate the final price because the computer will automatically buy
the optimal quantity given the actual price that occurs.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

Page 23
•

The actual price was 20, so you overestimated the price. However, your earnings
do not depend on the overestimation. Your computer automatically bought 11
units for you and you earned 121.

•

Your total earnings for the three day market week are:
1300 + 7.50 + 121 = 1428.50

10

Page 24 [Allow subjects to follow steps below between pgs. 22-24]
We will now walk you through a different 3-day practice week. Again, please pay
attention to the instructions as they may help you understand how to participate in Part
II of this experiment. In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 40.

11

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 20.
o This means that you estimating that today’s price will be higher than in
the future.

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 5.
o The numbers in the “Today” line mean that if the actual price today is
40, you will buy the 5 units you entered, and you will earn 275.

•

The numbers in the “Future” line show that 35 units is your best purchase
quantity on the last day if the future price on that day is actually 20 and you buy
nothing else in addition to today’s purchase before the last day. It also shows the
earnings (90) that you can expect on the last day if your entries are accurate.

•

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.

Page 25
•

Notice that, in this practice round, the price was 50 (more than you estimated),
so you bought 0 units (less than you estimated), and you made 0 in earnings
(less than your expected 980). These numbers appear in the “Past” line.

•

Now you are in day 2 and must again choose a price and a quantity. Notice that
the price today is set at 50 (yesterday’s market price) by default. Now you may
change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 25.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 30 (this implies that you are estimating
that today’s price will be lower than in the future).

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 30. Notice that if your estimates
about the prices are correct you will make 1900 in earnings today and 25 in the
future.

•

Press SUBMIT now.

Page 26
•

The actual price was 30 (higher than your estimate of 25), you bought 26 units
(less than your estimate of 30), and actually earned 1144 in Day 2.

•

You are now in the last market day, day 3. In any last day, the only thing you
can do is to estimate the price. Remember that in the last day your computer will
buy your optimal quantity given the market price.

12

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

Page 27
•

The actual price was 20. This means that you overestimated the price. Your
earnings however do not depend on the overestimation. Your computer bought
10 units and you made 100 in earnings.

•

Your total earnings for the week are:
0+1144+100 = 1244.

Page 28 [End Instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the second part of the experiment. Please
wait patiently while the remaining participants finish.
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Instructions (Sellers)-EXOGENOUS
Page 1
Introduction
This is an experiment on decision-making. You can earn money if you follow the
instructions and make decisions carefully. You will be paid in cash at the end of the
session. You can raise your hand to ask questions related to the experiment at any time.
Page 2

Overview

You will be a seller in this experiment. There are #NumSellers# sellers and
#NumBuyers# buyers in your market.
This experiment is divided into two parts. The first part will be simpler, but paying close
attention during the first part will help you make better decisions during the second part.
First we will explain Part I of the experiment and then we will explain your computer
screen. Finally, we will explain Part II of the experiment.
Page 3
Part I Instructions
As a seller, you will participate in #numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks where you can
sell your goods to buyers in order to make a profit. Every unit you sell will cost you
#productionCost#.
During Part I, you and the other sellers will each choose how many units to sell. Units
that you and the other sellers choose to sell will automatically be sold at the highest price
at which they will all sell. Therefore, the total quantity of units that you and the other
sellers decide to sell will dictate the price.
•
•

If you and the other sellers choose to sell only a few units, the market price will
be high.
If you and the other sellers choose to sell a lot of units, the market price will be
low.

Once all the sellers decide how many units to sell, you will see the total amount of units
the sellers chose to sell and the corresponding market price.

14

Page 4 [Load Figure 1 on client interface]
How is Price Determined?
Each week, buyers are assigned a certain number of units which give them value. For
example, suppose there are 3 buyers, each with a value for one unit. The total number of
units demanded is 3. Suppose the first buyer has a unit value of 25, the second buyer
has a unit value of 15 and the last buyer has a unit value of 5.
The buyers’ demand could then be graphically represented with three steps as shown on
the right.
If one seller offers to sell only one unit and the rest of the sellers offer to sell none, then
that one unit offered will be sold at the price of 25.
If the sellers offer to sell a total of 2 units, each unit will be sold at a price of 15.
If the sellers offer to sell a total of 3 units, each unit will be sold at a price of 5.
Figure 2

Value
Buyers’
demand

25

15

5
Quantity
1
Page 5 [Load figure 2]

2

3

How are Earnings Determined?

The red line at #productionCost# represents your cost of producing each unit.
Now, suppose that you offer to sell one unit and the other sellers offer to sell one unit in
total. This means that the total amount of units offered for sale is 2. The market price
will be 15 and your earnings will be 5 (market price - your cost = 15 – 10 = 5).

15

Your earnings are represented by the dotted area in the figure on the right.
The other sellers will also make a profit of 5, as they sold only one unit at the same
price and they have the same cost. Their earnings are represented in the shaded area.
Notice that the price and cost will be the same for all sellers. However, the number of
units each seller decides to sell may be different.
You make money in this experiment by selling units above your cost.
Figure 2

Price
Buyers’
Demand

25

Your Cost

15
10
5
1
Page 6 [Load Figure 3]

2

Quantity

3

Multi-Unit Demand

Buyers will actually have values for many more than 3 units, unlike our simple example
above. Because there will be so many units demanded (100 in the following example),
you will no longer be able to distinguish the individual steps in the graph, but the
interpretation of this multi-unit demand is exactly the same as before:
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Figure 3

Price
unit 1 has a value of 100
100
unit 30 has a value of 70
70
unit 70 has a value of 30
30
0
30

1

Page 7 [Load figure 4]

70

100

Quantity

Multi-Unit Demand & Price

If you offer to sell 25 units (shown with the brown arrow) and the other sellers offer to
sell an additional 45 units (shown with the yellow arrow), then there will be a total of 70
units offered for sale (25 + 45 = 70). From the figure we can see that the market price
will be 30.
If you sell 25 units at a price of 30 and each unit costs you #productionCost# to
produce, then your earnings will be 25 × ( 30 - #productionCost#) = #profit#.
Figure 4

Price
unit 1 has a value of 100
100
unit 25 has a value of 75
75
unit 70 has a value of 30
30
15

Your Cost = 15

0
1

25

70

100

17

Quantity

Page 8 [Show Computer Status Box]
Your Computer Screen
Now that we have explained Part I of the experiment, let’s discuss your computer
screen. Throughout the experiment, the Status Box will always be on the top-right part
of your computer screen.
The Status box will show you the:
•
•
•

Time Remaining in each week
Week number
Your earnings in dollars

In Part I, there will be # numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks.
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Page 9 [Show My Choice Box, let the user interface with the screen, have Ready to
Go On button enabled instead of Next Button]
Your Computer Screen
The numbers in the My Choice Box at the bottom of your screen provide you with
information about the quantity you and the other sellers may sell, the market price, and
your profit.
On this screen during Part I, you may enter the number of units you wish to sell and
your estimate about how many units the other sellers will offer to sell.
•

If you correctly estimate what the other sellers choose to offer, then the market
price and your earnings will be as shown in the graph.

•

If the actual quantity sold by others is higher than your estimate, then the actual
market price at which you will sell your units will be lower than what you
estimated.

•

If the actual quantity sold by others is lower than your estimate, then the actual
market price at which you will sell your units will be higher than what you
estimated.

The green shaded area gives the size of your earnings for the estimated price and
quantities.
Page 10 [End part I instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the first part of the experiment. Please wait
patiently while the other participants finish.

[DO PART I]
[When Part I is finished, send notification to client and begin Part II instructions]

Page 11 [Load Weeks and Days boxes instead of Week Num. in Client Status Box]
Instructions for Part II
Now we will explain Part II of the experiment. There will be #numPart2Weeks# weeks
during Part II. Each week is divided into #numDays# days. You will have an
opportunity to sell units in each day of the week.
You must make decisions about how to distribute your sales across the different days of
the week, given the buyers’ total demand.
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If you or any of the other sellers decide to sell units before the last day of the market
week, then these units will be subtracted from the buyers’ total demand for the
remainder of the week.
Notice that the market price may be different each day of the market week, and you are
always better off selling units at high rather than low prices.
Page 12
Should You Sell Each Day?
•

If you think that the price today will be higher than the price in the future, you
should sell now.

•

If you think that the price today will be lower than the price in the future, you
should wait until the day you expect the price to be the highest.

•

If you are unsure about the future market price, you may try selling some units
now and some later.

Page 13 [Load Figure 5]
Two-Day Market Example
Suppose a total of 100 units are demanded by the buyers. If 25 units are sold the first
day, then 75 units is what remains of the buyers’ demand. The remaining 75 units
demanded are shown by the blue line on the graph.
Now suppose 45 units are sold on the last day. This means a total of 70 of the 100 units
have been sold (25 + 45 = 70). In this case, the units sold on the last day are sold at a
price of 30.
The 25 units sold on the first day could have been sold at any price. The price on the
first day is determined by how many units are for sale that day and whether the buyers
prefer to buy more now or later.
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Figure 5

Price
Buyers’ Demand
for second day

100

30

70

25

100

Quantity

Page 14
How You Sell Units
To sell units, you must enter both a maximum quantity and the minimum price you will
accept per unit. You will receive the market price for any units you sell.
•

If the market price is lower than the price you submitted, then you will not sell
any of the units you offered.

•

If the market price is higher than the price you submitted, then you will sell all
the units you offered.

•

If the market price is the same as the price you submitted, you will sell some of
the quantity you offered.

Page 15

How is the Market Price Determined?

The market price for any day depends on two things:
1. The quantities and prices offered by all sellers.
2. The decisions of buyers on how much to buy now.
The market price is determined by finding the price at which the number of units willing
to be bought is equal to the number of units willing to be sold. It is possible that no units
will be sold if an agreeable price for buyers and sellers cannot be found.
Page 16 [Load Figure 6]
How are your Earnings Determined?
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Suppose that you offered 15 units at a minimum price of 20 and the other sellers
submitted an additional 40 units at various other prices. Suppose that the buyers were
willing to buy and the sellers willing to sell at total of 35 units at a market price of 50.
Because the market price is above your minimum price of 20, you sell all 15 of your
units and receive the market price (50) for each unit.
Your earnings (shown in the dotted area) are:
= (price - cost) × number of units
= (50 - 10) × 15
=
600
On the following day you will see a screen like the one below. Notice that a total of 35
units have been sold and the light gray demand above those units shows their actual
values to the buyers who purchased them. The remaining demand (the blue line) for the
following day is now smaller (100-35 = 65 units), and its values are lower. The results
of past days are always shown in grey, and the remaining demand for the rest of the
week is shown in color.
Figure 6

Price
Demand for
next days

100

Cost

50
10
15

35

100

Quantity

Page 17 [Allow subjects to follow steps laid out in pg. 18 – pg 20]
We will now walk you through a 3-day practice week. Please follow the instructions as
they may help you understand how to participate in Part II of this experiment.
Page 18
•

You begin in Day 1 of the 3-day market week.
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•

In the “Today” line enter 15 in MY QUANTITY and 30 in PRICE. These are
the numbers that matter, as they can determine your sales for today.

•

You can also enter an estimate of what you think the others are willing to sell
today. In the “Today” line enter 10 in OTHERS’ QUANTITY.

•

Notice the “Final” line has been filled for you with today’s offer. You can
change the “Final” line to reflect what you believe will happen in the future. In
the “Final” line enter a MY QUANTITY of 20 and an OTHER’S QUANTITY
of 25.
o Notice that the price on the last day will be 10 if these quantities are
actually sold. This is shown in the price box of the “Final” line.

•

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.

Page 19
•

Notice that for this practice round the actual price was 35 (more than your
minimum of 30), so you sold 15 units and earned 375. These numbers appear in
the “Past” line. Notice that OTHERS sold 5 (less than your estimate of 10).

•

Now you are in Day 2 and you must choose a price and a quantity again. Notice
that the price today is set at 35 by default (which is the last period’s price). Now
you may change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter 5 in MY QUANTITY and 25 in PRICE. Enter 10 for
OTHERS’ QUANTITY.

•

Press SUBMIT now.

Page 20
• Notice that the actual price was 20 (less than your minimum of 25). This implies
that you did not sell anything today, but others sold 15.
•

You are now in the last market day, Day 3. In any last day you can only submit a
quantity (and not a price). Everyone will sell all that they offer and the price will
only depend only on the total quantity offered. You may try to estimate
OTHERS’ QUANTITY and then see what the resulting market price will be if
your estimate is correct.

•

In the “Today” line enter 10 in MY QUANTITY and 10 in OTHERS’
QUANTITY. Notice that the market price will be 20 if your estimate is correct.
Press SUBMIT.

Page 21
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•

The actual price was 15. You sold your 10 units and made a profit of 50
(remember that it costs 10 to produce each unit.) The other sellers sold 15 units.

•

Your total earnings for the three days of the week are: 375 + 0 + 50 = 425.

Page 22
We will now guide you through a second 3-day practice week.
•

As in the earlier practice round, in the “Future” line enter 35 in MY
QUANTITY.

•

In the “Today” line enter 20 in MY QUANTITY and 27 in PRICE.

•

Also enter your estimate regarding what the others are willing to sell today. In
the “Today” line enter 15 in OTHERS’ QUANTITY.

•

Now, press SUBMIT.

Page 23
• Notice that the actual price is 25 (less than your minimum of 27), so you sold 0
units and had 0 earnings. These numbers appear in the “Past” line. Notice that
OTHERS sold 10 (less than your guess of 15).
•

Now, you are in Day 2 of the 3-day market week. You must now choose a price
and a quantity again. Notice that the price today is again set at 25 by default.
This is done to remind you about the last day’s price. You can change this price.
Notice also that the “Final” line displays the same numbers as in Day 1. You can
also change this.

•

In the “Today” line enter 20 in MY QUANTITY, and 20 in PRICE. Also enter
20 for OTHERS’ QUANTITY.

•

Now, press SUBMIT.

Page 24
•

Notice that the actual price was 25 (more than your minimum offer price of 20).
You sold 20 units today, with earnings of 300 and other sellers sold nothing.
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•

You are now in the last market day, Day 3. After choosing MY QUANTITY
you may try to estimate OTHERS’ QUANTITY and see what the market price
will be if your estimate is correct.

•

In the “Today” line enter 20 in MY QUANTITY and 25 in OTHERS’
QUANTITY. Notice that the price will be 25 if your estimate is correct. Press
SUBMIT.

Page 25
•

The actual price was 20. You sold your 20 units and with earnings of 200
(remember that it costs 10 to produce one unit.) Others sold 30 units.

•

Your total earnings for the three-day week are: 0 + 300 + 200 = 500.

Page 26 [End Instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the second part of the experiment. Please
wait patiently while the other participants finish.
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Instructions (Buyers)
Page 1
Introduction
This is an experiment on decision-making. You can earn money if you follow the
instructions and make decisions carefully. You will be paid in cash at the end of the
session. You can raise your hand to ask questions related to the experiment at any time.

Page 2

Overview

You will be a buyer in this experiment. There are #NumSellers# sellers and
#NumBuyers# buyers in your market.
This experiment is divided into two parts. During the first part, you will not be making
any decisions, but you will be able to learn about the experiment. In the second part,
you will be making decisions. Paying close attention during the first part will help you
make better choices during the second part.
First we will explain Part I of the experiment and then we will explain your computer
screen. Finally, we will explain Part II of the experiment.

Page 3
Part I Instructions
As a buyer, you will not make any buying decisions during Part I. You will simply
observe #numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks of seller decisions and your computer will
automatically buy units for you.
During Part I, each seller will independently decide how many units to sell. The total
quantity of units that the sellers decide to sell will dictate the price.
•
•

If sellers choose to sell only a few units, the market price will be high.
If sellers choose to sell a lot of units, the market price will be low.

Once all the sellers decide how many units to sell, you will see the total amount of units
the sellers chose to sell and the corresponding market price.
Page 4 [Load Figure 1 on client interface]
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What is your Demand?
Each week you are assigned a certain number of units which give you value. For
example, suppose you have value for 3 units. The first unit gives you a value of 25, the
second unit gives you a value of 15 and the last unit gives you a value of 5.
Your demand can then be graphically represented with three steps as shown on the
right.
Figure 3

Value
Your
demand

25

15

5
Quantity
1

2

3

Page 5 [Load figure 2]
Suppose that the market price is 8, represented by the line that crosses at 8. It shows you
whether the market price is higher or lower than your unit values. Your profits are shown
by the shaded area.
Your profit for each unit equals your value (25, 15, or 5) minus the market price (8) you
must pay. Because the value of your third unit (5) is worth less than the market price (8),
you should not buy it. Your earnings are shown as the shaded portion of the graph and
can be calculated as:
(25-8) + (15-8) = 17 + 7 = 24
You make money in this experiment by purchasing units that have values above the
market price.
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Figure 2

Price & Value
25

Your
demand

15

Market Price

8
5
1

2

Quantity

3

Page 6 [Load Figure 3]
Multi-Unit Demand
You will actually have values for many more than 3 units, unlike our simple example
above. Because there will be so many units demanded (50 in the following example), you
will no longer be able to distinguish the individual steps in the graph, but the interpretation
of this multi-unit demand is exactly the same as before:
Figure 3

Price
unit 1 has a value of 100
100
unit 15 has a value of 70
70
unit 35 has a value of 30
30
0
1

15

35

50

Page 7 [Load figure 4]
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Quantity

Maximizing Profit
Remember, during Part I your computer will automatically buy the quantity that gives
you the highest earnings. If your demand is like the one in the graph and the market
price is 20, then your computer will buy 40 units, because each of those units has a
value greater than 20. The shaded area would represent your total earnings of 1600,
which is 40 units times an average profit of ½ × (100-20).
Figure 4

Price
Your
deman

100

Market Price

20
40

50

Quantity

Page 8 [Show Computer Status Box]
Your Computer Screen
Now that we have explained Part I of the experiment, let’s discuss your computer
screen. Throughout the experiment, the Status Box will always be on the top-right part
of your computer screen.
The Status box will show you the:
•
•
•

Time Remaining in each Day
Week number
Your earnings in dollars

In Part 1, there will be # numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks.
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Page 9 [Show My Choice Box, let the user interface with the screen, have Ready to
Go On button enabled instead of Next Button]
Your Computer Screen
The numbers in the My Choice Box at the bottom of your screen provide you with
information about the relationship between the quantity you buy, the market price, and
your profit.
On this screen during Part I, you may enter your estimate of the next market price. This
will have no effect on your earnings whatsoever, but it will help you learn to accurately
estimate prices which will be needed during Part II.
•

If your estimate is correct, then the numbers you see will show the exact
quantity you will buy and the earnings you will make when your computer
automatically buys the quantity that maximizes your earnings.

•

If the actual market price is higher than your estimate, then both the quantity you
buy and your earnings will be lower than what you estimated.

•

If the actual market price is lower than your estimate, then both the quantity you
buy and your earnings will be higher than what you estimated.

The green shaded area gives the size of your earnings for the estimated price and
quantity.
Page 10 [End part I instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the first part of the experiment. Please wait
patiently while the remaining participants finish.

[DO PART I]
[When Part I is finished, send notification to client and begin Part II instructions]

Page 11 [Load Weeks and Days boxes instead of Week Num. in Client Status Box]
Instructions for Part II
Now we will explain Part II of the experiment. There will be #numPart2Weeks# weeks
during Part II. Each week is divided into #numDays# days. You will have an
opportunity to purchase units in each day of the week.
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You must make decisions about how to distribute your purchases across the different
days of the week, given your total demand.
If you decide to buy some units before the last day of the market week, then these units
will be subtracted from your total demand.
On the last day of the market your computer will automatically buy every unit of
demand that you have remaining that has a value above the market price. This
maximizes your profit.
Notice that the market price may be different each day of the market week, and you are
always better off buying at low rather than high prices.
Page 12 [Load Figure 5]
Week Example
Say you begin with a demand for 50 units, and on day 1 you buy 10 units at a price of
40. Suppose that on day 2 you buy 15 more units at a price of 20.
Your remaining demand for the rest of the week is 25 units (50-10-15), with the highest
remaining units valued at 50 and the lowest one valued at 0. Your remaining demand is
represented on the graph to the right by the blue part of the original demand.
Also notice in the graph you can see the quantity you purchased and what price you
paid for day 1 and day 2. Finally, your profits for day 1 (500) and day 2 (675) are
shaded in gray and green respectively.
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Figure 5

Page 13
How You Buy Units
To buy units (except on the last day), you must enter both a quantity and the price per
unit that you are willing to pay for exactly that many units.
•

If the market price is the same as the price you submitted, you will buy exactly
the quantity you asked for.

•

If the market price is lower than the price you submitted, then you will buy
more than the quantity you asked for.

•

If the market price is higher than the price you submitted, then you will buy less
than the quantity you asked for.

Page 14

How is the Market Price Determined?

The market price is determined by comparing the prices you and other buyers are
willing to pay for units to the price the sellers are willing the sell their units, and finding
the single “market” price that maximizes the number of sales.
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Page 15 [Load Figure 6]
How You Buy Units
Now let’s go through an example. Suppose you have a total demand for at most 50
units, and you submit a price of 30 and a quantity of 20 on the first day. That
information creates your submitted demand, shown with the dark blue line. Your
actual purchase will always be somewhere along the dark blue line that represents your
submitted demand. Notice your submitted demand says that you would be willing to
purchase 1 unit at a price of 50, or 2 units at a price of 49, …or 20 units at a price of 30,
... or 50 units at a price of 1.
Figure 6

Price
Your true demand
100
Your submitted demand
(your purchase must be
somewhere along this line)

50
30

20

50

Quantity

Page 16
You are not required to purchase units every day. But you make the largest
profit by buying units on the day or days when the price is the lowest.

33

Page 17 [Load figure 7]
Daily Market Results
Suppose that on the first day you actually buy 15 units at a price of 35. For the next day
the screen will display a graph like the one you see to the right. In the graph, the past
results are shown as grayed out with the darker area showing your previous day’s profit.
Your remaining demand for the rest of the days in the market is shown in color:
Figure 7

Page 18 [Show the entire My Choice Box]
Complete Screen Image
Notice the My Choice Box at the bottom right of the screen. It provides you with
information about quantity, price, and earnings from day to day.
To help you make your decisions, the screen shows you information about the past days
(grayed out), and allows you to enter your quantity and price for today (except on the
last day), and also allows you to make an estimate about the future market price.
As you try different combinations of these numbers, you can see what your expected
future quantity purchased and earnings would be. If you don’t press the “submit” button
to finally submit your demand (quantity and price) for the current day, it will be
assumed that you do not want to buy anything today.
On the last day of the market you will not be able to submit your demand (quantity and
price) as your computer will automatically buy any of your remaining true demand that
has a value above the market price.
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Page 19 [Allow subjects to follow steps laid out in pg. 19 – pg 21]
We will now walk you through a 3-day practice week. Please follow the instructions as
they may help you understand how to participate in Part II of this experiment.
Page 20
•

You begin in Day 1 of the three day market week.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 40.
o This means you are estimating that today’s price will be lower than the
future price (40 > 30), so you might try buying something today.

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 20.
o The numbers in the “Today” line mean that if the actual price today is
30, you will buy the 20 units you entered, and will make earnings of 980.

•

The numbers in the “Future” line show that 10 units will be your best purchase
on the last day if the future price on that day turns out to be 40, and you buy
nothing else in addition to today’s purchase before the last day. It also shows the
earnings (90) that you can expect to make on the last day if your entries are
accurate.

•

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.
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Page 21
•

Notice that the actual price was 24 (less than you estimated), so you bought 26
units (more than you estimated), and you made 1300 in earnings (more than
your expected earnings of 980). These numbers appear in the “Past” line.

•

Now you are in Day 2, and must again choose a price and a quantity. Notice that
your estimated price for today is set at 24 (yesterday’s market price) by default.
Now you may change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 25.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 30 (this implies that you are estimating
that today’s price will be lower than the future price (25 < 30)).

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 9. Press SUBMIT now.

Page 22
•

Notice that the market price was 35 (more than you estimated) so you bought
only 3 units (<9) and made 7.5 in earnings.

•

You are now in the last market day, day 3. On the last day, the only thing you
can do is to estimate the final price because the computer will automatically buy
the optimal quantity given the actual price that occurs.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

Page 23
•

The actual price was 20, so you overestimated the price. However, your earnings
do not depend on the overestimation. Your computer automatically bought 11
units for you and you earned 121.

•

Your total earnings for the three day market week are:
1300 + 7.50 + 121 = 1428.50
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Page 24 [Allow subjects to follow steps below between pgs. 22-24]
We will now walk you through a different 3-day practice week. Again, please pay
attention to the instructions as they may help you understand how to participate in Part
II of this experiment.
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•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 40.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 20.
o This means that you estimating that today’s price will be higher than in
the future.

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 5.
o The numbers in the “Today” line mean that if the actual price today is
40, you will buy the 5 units you entered, and you will earn 275.

•

The numbers in the “Future” line show that 35 units is your best purchase
quantity on the last day if the future price on that day is actually 20 and you buy
nothing else in addition to today’s purchase before the last day. It also shows the
earnings (90) that you can expect on the last day if your entries are accurate.

•

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.

Page 25
•

Notice that, in this practice round, the price was 50 (more than you estimated),
so you bought 0 units (less than you estimated), and you made 0 in earnings
(less than your expected 980). These numbers appear in the “Past” line.

•

Now you are in day 2 and must again choose a price and a quantity. Notice that
the price today is set at 50 (yesterday’s market price) by default. Now you may
change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 25.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 30 (this implies that you are estimating
that today’s price will be lower than in the future).

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 30. Notice that if your estimates
about the prices are correct you will make 1900 in earnings today and 25 in the
future.

•

Press SUBMIT now.

Page 26
•

The actual price was 30 (higher than your estimate of 25), you bought 26 units
(less than your estimate of 30), and actually earned 1144 in Day 2.
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•

You are now in the last market day, day 3. In any last day, the only thing you
can do is to estimate the price. Remember that in the last day your computer will
buy your optimal quantity given the market price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

Page 27
•

The actual price was 20. This means that you overestimated the price. Your
earnings however do not depend on the overestimation. Your computer bought
10 units and you made 100 in earnings.

•

Your total earnings for the week are:
0+1144+100 = 1244.

Page 28 [End Instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the second part of the experiment. Please
wait patiently while the remaining participants finish.
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Instructions (Buyers)-ENDOGENOUS
Page 1
Introduction
This is an experiment on decision-making. You can earn money if you follow the
instructions and make decisions carefully. You will be paid in cash at the end of the
session. You can raise your hand to ask questions related to the experiment at any time.

Page 2

Overview

You will be a buyer in this experiment. There are #NumSellers# sellers and
#NumBuyers# buyers in your market.
This experiment is divided into two parts. During the first part, you will not be making
any decisions, but you will be able to learn about the experiment. In the second part,
you will be making decisions. Paying close attention during the first part will help you
make better choices during the second part.
First we will explain Part I of the experiment and then we will explain your computer
screen. Finally, we will explain Part II of the experiment.

Page 3
Part I Instructions
As a buyer, you will not make any buying decisions during Part I. You will simply
observe #numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks of seller decisions and your computer will
automatically buy units for you.
During Part I, each seller will independently decide how many units to sell. The total
quantity of units that the sellers decide to sell will dictate the price.
•
•

If sellers choose to sell only a few units, the market price will be high.
If sellers choose to sell a lot of units, the market price will be low.

Once all the sellers decide how many units to sell, you will see the total amount of units
the sellers chose to sell and the corresponding market price.
Page 4 [Load Figure 1 on client interface]
40

What is your Demand?
Each week you are assigned a certain number of units which give you value. For
example, suppose you have value for 3 units. The first unit gives you a value of 25, the
second unit gives you a value of 15 and the last unit gives you a value of 5.
Your demand can then be graphically represented with three steps as shown on the
right.
Figure 4

Value
Your
demand

25

15

5
Quantity
1

2

3

Page 5 [Load figure 2]
Suppose that the market price is 8, represented by the line that crosses at 8. It shows you
whether the market price is higher or lower than your unit values. Your profits are shown
by the shaded area.
Your profit for each unit equals your value (25, 15, or 5) minus the market price (8) you
must pay. Because the value of your third unit (5) is worth less than the market price (8),
you should not buy it. Your earnings are shown as the shaded portion of the graph and
can be calculated as:
(25-8) + (15-8) = 17 + 7 = 24
You make money in this experiment by purchasing units that have values above the
market price.
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Figure 2

Price & Value
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Market Price

8
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Quantity

3

Page 6 [Load Figure 3]
Multi-Unit Demand
You will actually have values for many more than 3 units, unlike our simple example
above. Because there will be so many units demanded (50 in the following example), you
will no longer be able to distinguish the individual steps in the graph, but the interpretation
of this multi-unit demand is exactly the same as before:
Figure 3

Price
unit 1 has a value of 100
100
unit 15 has a value of 70
70
unit 35 has a value of 30
30
0
1

15

35

50

Page 7 [Load figure 4]
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Quantity

Maximizing Profit
Remember, during Part I your computer will automatically buy the quantity that gives
you the highest earnings. If your demand is like the one in the graph and the market
price is 20, then your computer will buy 40 units, because each of those units has a
value greater than 20. The shaded area would represent your total earnings of 1600,
which is 40 units times an average profit of ½ × (100-20).
Figure 4

Price
Your
deman

100

Market Price

20
40

50

Quantity

Page 8 [Show Computer Status Box]
Your Computer Screen
Now that we have explained Part I of the experiment, let’s discuss your computer
screen. Throughout the experiment, the Status Box will always be on the top-right part
of your computer screen.
The Status box will show you the:
•
•
•

Time Remaining in each Day
Week number
Your earnings in dollars

In Part 1, there will be # numPart1Weeks# consecutive weeks.
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Page 9 [Show My Choice Box, let the user interface with the screen, have Ready to
Go On button enabled instead of Next Button]
Your Computer Screen
The numbers in the My Choice Box at the bottom of your screen provide you with
information about the relationship between the quantity you buy, the market price, and
your profit.
On this screen during Part I, you may enter your estimate of the next market price. This
will have no effect on your earnings whatsoever, but it will help you learn to accurately
estimate prices which will be needed during Part II.
•

If your estimate is correct, then the numbers you see will show the exact
quantity you will buy and the earnings you will make when your computer
automatically buys the quantity that maximizes your earnings.

•

If the actual market price is higher than your estimate, then both the quantity you
buy and your earnings will be lower than what you estimated.

•

If the actual market price is lower than your estimate, then both the quantity you
buy and your earnings will be higher than what you estimated.

The green shaded area gives the size of your earnings for the estimated price and
quantity.
Page 10 [End part I instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the first part of the experiment. Please wait
patiently while the remaining participants finish.

[DO PART I]
[When Part I is finished, send notification to client and begin Part II instructions]

Page 11 [Load Weeks and Days boxes instead of Week Num. in Client Status Box]
Instructions for Part II
Now we will explain Part II of the experiment. Each week is divided into several days.
The number of days are determined whether units are sold or not in any certain day.
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You will have an opportunity to buy units in different days of the week with the
following rule: The number of days depends on whether some quantity is sold or not in
the market:
1.
There is a first day in the week.
2.
If nothing is sold in the market, then there will be just one additional day. This
will be the final day of the week.
3.
If some quantity is sold on any day (including the first day), there will be a
following day.
4.
Days will be added as long as some quantities are sold.
5.
For example. If some quantity is sold in days 1, 2, and 3, but nothing is sold in
day 4, then the market will be open one final day, day 5, and the week end on this day
(day 5).
Page 12 [Load Figure 5]
Week Example
Say you begin with a demand for 50 units, and on day 1 you buy 10 units at a price of
40. Suppose that on day 2 you buy 15 more units at a price of 20.
Your remaining demand for the rest of the week is 25 units (50-10-15), with the highest
remaining units valued at 50 and the lowest one valued at 0. Your remaining demand is
represented on the graph to the right by the blue part of the original demand.
Also notice in the graph you can see the quantity you purchased and what price you
paid for day 1 and day 2. Finally, your profits for day 1 (500) and day 2 (675) are
shaded in gray and green respectively.
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Figure 5

Page 13
How You Buy Units
To buy units (except on the last day), you must enter both a quantity and the price per
unit that you are willing to pay for exactly that many units.
•

If the market price is the same as the price you submitted, you will buy exactly
the quantity you asked for.

•

If the market price is lower than the price you submitted, then you will buy
more than the quantity you asked for.

•

If the market price is higher than the price you submitted, then you will buy less
than the quantity you asked for.

Page 14

How is the Market Price Determined?

The market price is determined by comparing the prices you and other buyers are
willing to pay for units to the price the sellers are willing the sell their units, and finding
the single “market” price that maximizes the number of sales.
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Page 15 [Load Figure 6]
How You Buy Units
Now let’s go through an example. Suppose you have a total demand for at most 50
units, and you submit a price of 30 and a quantity of 20 on the first day. That
information creates your submitted demand, shown with the dark blue line. Your
actual purchase will always be somewhere along the dark blue line that represents your
submitted demand. Notice your submitted demand says that you would be willing to
purchase 1 unit at a price of 50, or 2 units at a price of 49, …or 20 units at a price of 30,
... or 50 units at a price of 1.
Figure 6

Price
Your true demand
100
Your submitted demand
(your purchase must be
somewhere along this line)

50
30

20

50

Quantity

Page 16
You are not required to purchase units every day. But you make the largest
profit by buying units on the day or days when the price is the lowest.
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Page 17 [Load figure 7]
Daily Market Results
Suppose that on the first day you actually buy 15 units at a price of 35. For the next day
the screen will display a graph like the one you see to the right. In the graph, the past
results are shown as grayed out with the darker area showing your previous day’s profit.
Your remaining demand for the rest of the days in the market is shown in color:
Figure 7

Page 18 [Show the entire My Choice Box]
Complete Screen Image
Notice the My Choice Box at the bottom right of the screen. It provides you with
information about quantity, price, and earnings from day to day.
To help you make your decisions, the screen shows you information about the past days
(grayed out), and allows you to enter your quantity and price for today (except on the
last day), and also allows you to make an estimate about the future market price.
As you try different combinations of these numbers, you can see what your expected
future quantity purchased and earnings would be. If you don’t press the “submit” button
to finally submit your demand (quantity and price) for the current day, it will be
assumed that you do not want to buy anything today.
On the last day of the market you will not be able to submit your demand (quantity and
price) as your computer will automatically buy any of your remaining true demand that
has a value above the market price.
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Page 19 [Allow subjects to follow steps laid out in pg. 19 – pg 21]
Practice
We will now walk you through a 3-day practice week. Please follow the instructions as
they may help you understand how to participate in Part II of this experiment.
Notice that the example is illustrative and does not strictly follow the way the
market is structured in today’s experiment. That is, in the actual experiment if
there are zero sales any day, the following day is the last day of that week. This will
not be the case in the example.
Page 20
•

You begin in Day 1 of the three day market week.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 40.
o This means you are estimating that today’s price will be lower than the
future price (40 > 30), so you might try buying something today.

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 20.
o The numbers in the “Today” line mean that if the actual price today is
30, you will buy the 20 units you entered, and will make earnings of 980.

•

The numbers in the “Future” line show that 10 units will be your best purchase
on the last day if the future price on that day turns out to be 40, and you buy
nothing else in addition to today’s purchase before the last day. It also shows the
earnings (90) that you can expect to make on the last day if your entries are
accurate.

•

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.
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Page 21
•

Notice that the actual price was 24 (less than you estimated), so you bought 26
units (more than you estimated), and you made 1300 in earnings (more than
your expected earnings of 980). These numbers appear in the “Past” line.

•

Now you are in Day 2, and must again choose a price and a quantity. Notice that
your estimated price for today is set at 24 (yesterday’s market price) by default.
Now you may change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 25.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 30 (this implies that you are estimating
that today’s price will be lower than the future price (25 < 30)).

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 9. Press SUBMIT now.

Page 22
•

Notice that the market price was 35 (more than you estimated) so you bought
only 3 units (<9) and made 7.5 in earnings.

•

You are now in the last market day, day 3. On the last day, the only thing you
can do is to estimate the final price because the computer will automatically buy
the optimal quantity given the actual price that occurs.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

Page 23
•

The actual price was 20, so you overestimated the price. However, your earnings
do not depend on the overestimation. Your computer automatically bought 11
units for you and you earned 121.

•

Your total earnings for the three day market week are:
1300 + 7.50 + 121 = 1428.50
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Page 24 [Allow subjects to follow steps below between pgs. 22-24]
Practice 2
We will now walk you through a different 3-day practice week. Again, please pay
attention to the instructions as they may help you understand how to participate in Part
II of this experiment.
Notice again that the example is illustrative and does not strictly follow the structure of
today’s experiment. That is, if there are zero sales any day in the actual experiment, the
following day is the last day of that week.
•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 40.

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 5.
o The numbers in the “Today” line mean that if the actual price today is
40, you will buy the 5 units you entered, and you will earn 275.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 20.
o This means that you estimating that today’s price will be higher than in
the future.

•

The numbers in the “Future” line show that 35 units is your best purchase
quantity on the last day if the future price on that day is actually 20 and you buy
nothing else in addition to today’s purchase before the last day. It also shows the
earnings (1225) that you can expect on the last day if your entries are accurate.

Press SUBMIT now to finalize your entries.
Continue to the Next page of instructions.
Page 25
•

Notice that, in this practice round, the price was 50 (more than you estimated),
so you bought 0 units (less than you estimated), and you made 0 in earnings
(less than your expected 980). These numbers appear in the “Past” line.

•

Now you are in day 2 and must again choose a price and a quantity. Notice that
the price today is set at 50 (yesterday’s market price) by default. Now you may
change this price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 25.

•

In the “Future” line enter a PRICE of 30 (this implies that you are estimating
that today’s price will be lower than in the future).

51

•

In the “Today” line enter a QUANTITY of 30. Notice that if your estimates
about the prices are correct you will make 1900 in earnings today and 25 in the
future.

•

Press SUBMIT now.

Page 26
•

The actual price was 30 (higher than your estimate of 25), you bought 26 units
(less than your estimate of 30), and actually earned 1144 in Day 2.

•

You are now in the last market day, day 3. In any last day, the only thing you
can do is to estimate the price. Remember that in the last day your computer will
buy your optimal quantity given the market price.

•

In the “Today” line enter a PRICE of 30.

Page 27
•

The actual price was 20. This means that you overestimated the price. Your
earnings however do not depend on the overestimation. Your computer bought
10 units and you made 100 in earnings.

•

Your total earnings for the week are:
0+1144+100 = 1244.

Page 28 [End Instructions]
You have now finished the instructions for the second part of the experiment.
Recall that if there are zero sales any day, the following day is the last day of that
week.
For example, if there are no sales on day-1, then day-2 is the last day of the week.
Similarly if there are no sales on day 3, then day 4 is the last day of the week, and
so on.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer
them. If you are finished with the instructions, please click the Start button. The
instructions will remain on your screen until everyone is ready and the experiment
starts. Please wait patiently while the remaining participants finish.
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